Since its birth in 1944, the World Bank has had a strong focus on development projects. Yet, it did not have a project evaluation unit until the early 1970s. An early attempt to conceptualize project appraisal had been made in the 1960s by Albert Hirschman, whose undertaking raised high expectations at the Bank. Hirschman's conclusions-published first in internal Bank reports and then, as a book in 1967-disappointed many at the Bank, primarily because they found it impractical. Hirschman wanted to offer the Bank a new vision by transforming the Bank's approach to project design, project management and project appraisal. What the Bank expected from Hirschman, HOWEVER, was not a revolution but an examination of the Bank's projects and advice on how to make project design and This paper is a product of the Knowledge and Information Services Unit, Information Management and Technology Network. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http:// econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at ma2944@columbia.edu. management more measurable, controllable, and suitable for replication. The history of this failed collaboration provides useful insights on the unstable equilibrium between operations and evaluation within the Bank. In addition, it shows that the Bank actively participated in the development economics debates of the 1960s. This should be of interest for development economists today who reflect on the future of their discipline emphasizing the need for a non-dogmatic approach to development. It should also be of interest for the Bank itself, which is stressing the importance of evaluation for effective development policies. The history of the practice of development economics, using archival material, can bring new perspectives and help better understand the evolution of this discipline.
We decide not on the basis of what we know but on the basis of what we do not know.
Bayless Manning to Albert Hirschman, August 29, 1967 1 
Introduction
For an organization like the World Bank, with its commitment to development finance, project evaluation is an essential activity. Yet this function was not conceptualized by the Bank until the 1960s, and it was put into practice only in the early 1970s, more than twentyfive years after the Bank was created. In 1964, after twenty years of operations, the Bank carried out the first in-depth evaluation of its own projects; by that point it had already made 480 loans to 85 countries, totaling almost $10 billion, in a broad spectrum of sectors including industry, agriculture and fishing, electric power, and education.
2 How this fundamental development occurred, and why it happened so late, is the subject of this paper.
This subject may at first seem narrow, but in reality, it opens a particularly interesting perspective on the evolution of development theories after the foundational phase of development economics in the aftermath of World War II, shedding light on the ways in which global development institutions reacted to those theoretical changes in order to foster effective development policies in less developed countries. Far from being a matter internal to the World Bank, the discussion on project evaluation that took place in the 1960s is important for the broader history of development theory and institutions: it marked a shift both in the theoretical landscape of development economics, and in the policy strategies of the World Bank, the most important multilateral player in the development field.
Up until the 1960s, the theoretical landscape had been characterized by debates about macroapproaches to development strategies, such as "balanced growth" vs. "unbalanced growth,"
and project appraisal and evaluation had remained a somewhat marginal topic in the larger field of development economics. The World Bank was accustomed to making ex-ante evaluations of the "soundness" of projects -soundness being the jargon of those times -and was satisfied as long as its loans were repaid by the recipient countries. Of course, the usually prolonged relations between the Bank and client countries made it natural for the Bank's officers to consider and discuss previous experiences, and a few evaluational studies of specific Bank projects had been promoted by the Bank in the early 1960s. Yet no systematic evaluation of Bank-financed projects or assessment of their success (or lack thereof) had been put into place. The Bank had no independent evaluation function in its organizational chart, and its first project evaluations were implemented by operational staff.
When Albert Hirschman -a prominent economist at Columbia University and a founding father of development economics in the 1950s -proposed joining forces with the Bank to study some general elements of project appraisal, he was venturing into almost completely unexplored territory. Hirschman showed the centrality of project appraisal for the design and implementation of effective development projects, thereby becoming a major contributor, as
we will see, to the shift in development economics from broad development theories to more
focused analyses of what happens at project level. His groundbreaking volume, Development
Projects Observed (1967a) , emerged from his study of a series of World Bank projects in the mid-1960s, and served as the first attempt to establish project evaluation as a standard practice in the development field (Picciotto 1994; Willoughby 2003 ). Yet his emphasis on the intrinsic uncertainty of knowledge derived from project evaluation, as well as his reluctance to make his reflections more "operational," complicated his relationship with the Bank. The
Hirschman study, for which Bank staff and management had such high expectations, soon disappointed most of them. Furthermore, the Bank all but ignored the final outcome of his project, the 1967 book, and especially disliked its first chapter, "The principle of the hiding hand," which was widely circulated after appearing as a separate article in Daniel Bell's and Irving Kristol's journal The Public Interest (Hirschman 1967a and 1967b) . In particular,
Hirschman's insistence on uncertainty as a structural element in the decision-making process did not fit in well with the operational drive of Bank economists and engineers.
This paper is based mostly on previously undisclosed archival material from the World Bank
Archives and the Albert Hirschman papers held at Princeton University. It will tell the story of the genesis, development, and conclusion of Hirschman's collaboration with the World Bank, and discuss its relevance for the postwar history of development. The study of these dynamics allows for a better understanding of how an institution thinks, how it produces and uses knowledge, and how it positions itself in the international market of development knowledge.
As Judith Tendler has masterfully explained, strong tensions arise between the intrinsically uncertain nature of the knowledge acquired on development issues, the limits of knowledge transmission between donors and domestic recipients, and the status of "development experts"
with which individuals and whole institutions present themselves on the development stage.
Similar considerations to those discussed in this paper could be applied to the bilateral US Agency for International Development and the multilateral United Nations Development Programme (Tendler 1975; Murphy 2006) . This discussion becomes particularly relevant due to the increasing importance that knowledge production, accumulation, and transmission have acquired in the development world. Since 1996, the World Bank has defined itself as a "knowledge bank"; that is, a bank transferring to developing countries not just financial resources, but also "knowledge assets" (for a recent reaffirmation of this, see World Bank 2011). There is thus a direct link between today's reflections on how to shape efficient multilateral development institutions and those early discussions on what kind of knowledge is needed to design and implement more effective development projects.
Albert Hirschman and the 1960s turn in development economics
Development economics as an autonomous field of study took shape at the end of World War II, as a result of the demise of colonial empires; the birth of many new, less-developed countries in Asia and Africa; and the industrialization efforts of Latin American countries.
Early development theories were characterized by a high degree of abstraction; they discussed general sets of typical "conditions" of underdevelopment and "obstacles" to development, and were translated into broad approaches to policy and often comprehensive economic planning.
Paul Krugman defined the first fifteen years of the new discipline as the "glory days of high development theory" (1994, p. 40; see also Krugman 1992 Development (1958) , which radically criticized the balanced approach, proposing instead an "unbalanced" strategy for economic growth, in the same vein as Paul Streeten (1959) . In Krugman's view, the publication of Albert
Hirschman's book in 1958 marked the end of that early period of confrontation between grand development theories, and coincided with a methodological crisis in the discipline which would effectively make development economics a marginal field of economic research. While Krugman's thesis -which highlights the lack of formal modeling on the part of development economists as the main reason for their marginalization -is questionable (see, for example, Stiglitz 1992), it is nonetheless true that, between the late 1950s and the mid-1960s, the nature of analysis and debate within development economics was changing in profound ways. The years of broad, overarching development theories were giving way to more detailed, countryand time-specific analyses.
By the early 1960s, development economics had moved beyond its foundational phase, which was characterized by heavy, systemic discussions, and mutually delegitimizing general theories vying for hegemony within the discipline. Global and all-embracing theories, though still alive and well after this period, came no longer to represent the most advanced reflections in development studies. 3 A new wave in development economics brought increased complexity to the analytical landscape. Broad generalizations were considered increasingly inadequate to address country-specific bottlenecks; therefore, much more specific and targeted analyses were needed to tackle underdevelopment successfully. Furthermore, the centrality of per capita income as an indicator of development began to wane as additional factors were taken into consideration, such as nutrition, public health, education, and housing (Hirschman 1981 ).
Albert Hirschman was among the inspirational leading figures for this new season of development economics. In keeping with his role as a dissenter in the "old generation,"
Hirschman was among the first to form new hypotheses to frame and test the process of development and the causes of economic and social backwardness. Following in the footsteps of Alexander Gerschenkron's studies in economic history, which had demonstrated that the process of economic growth had not followed the same pattern in different countries, but had unfolded for each country in a different way (Gerschenkron 1962, though Underdevelopment having been diagnosed as something so multifaceted, tangled, and deep-rooted, it was often concluded that the situation called for revolution, massive redistribution of wealth and power from the rich to the poor countries, or at least coordinated attack on pervasive backwardness through highly competent central planning.
But what if none of these dei ex machina are available to take matters properly in hand? What if the fortress of underdevelopment, just because it is so formidable, can not be conquered by frontal assault? In that unfortunately quite common case, we need to know much more about ways in which the fortress can be surrounded, weakened by infiltration or subversion, and eventually taken by similar indirect tactics and processes. And I suggest that the major contribution to our knowledge of economic development must now come from detailed studies of such processes (Hirschman 1968a, pp. vii-viii Colombia, and inflation in Chile. As he put it, "the essence of this volume is in the flow of the three stories" (Hirschman 1963, p. 1) . To understand the problems faced by economic policy- 4 For other examples, see Weaver 1968 and Echeverría 1969. makers in Latin America, Hirschman felt that "the best method of looking for answers was to scrutinize the record of a few specific, documented, protracted, significant policy problems" (Hirschman 1963, p. 2) . This propensity for historically-grounded analyses would remain an important feature of Hirschman's approach. As he suggested at a 1980 conference:
Following in detail the process of a revolution gives us a strong feeling, as the structuralist approach does not, for the many might-have-beens of history […] . As a result, the event-minded historian is less likely than the sociologist to declare that, given such a structural condition, the outcome was preordained.
[This] emphasis on the revolutionary process […] in effect promises to restore a few degrees of freedom we were in danger of losing to the structuralists (Hirschman 1980, pp. 171-172) .
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The research that resulted in Hirschman's 1967 book, Development Projects Observed, followed the same approach. Although the book does not contain the stories of the individual projects analyzed, the research had an "intensive concern with 'cases'" and the projects considered had "an extended history." "Immersion in the particular," Hirschman concluded, "proved […] essential for the catching of anything general" (Hirschman 1967a, p. 3) .
This tension between the particular and the general was an answer to the widespread disorientation, among development practitioners and scholars, regarding the state of knowledge about development. General and unifying theories had given way to a much more fragmented body of knowledge, and the promise of better insights had been coupled with the feeling of a lack of vision. A 1964 Brookings Institution report on foreign aid summarized this unresolved tension:
Aid is being extended, bilaterally and multilaterally, to 100 countries, democratic and authoritarian, allied and neutral, progressing and retrogressing, without satisfactory standards for evaluating competing claims, promoting particular strategies, harmonizing aid with other available instruments of policy, or appraising the results achieved. There is need for a better political, moral and economic framework within which to review our foreign aid programs and to prepare recommendations regarding their future. 5 For one more testimony to Hirschman's sensitivity to the role of historical reconstruction, see his opinion of Marx's work: "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte was a particularly fine work. His historical books were much less orthodox than his economic ones.
[…] I like to understand how things happen, how change actually takes place" (Hirschman 1998, p. 67 1973) . 13 The relations between the two institutions -Brookings and the Bank -were strengthened by their common location in Washington, D.C. In addition, their top managers belonged to the same intellectual and social milieu: an élite of development practitioners and intellectuals, who worked in different organizations but were part of the same social networks and circles, whether informal or formal (e.g. the Society for International Development). 14 Another equally fundamental part of the research was a detailed study of the impact of selected World Bank projects on the social and economic structure of client countries, that is, the study originally proposed by Albert Hirschman.
The principal purpose of Hirschman's study was, in his words, "to explore in detail the direct effects as well as the broad repercussions of a project on economy and society," as well as to reach "some improvements in the process of project evaluation and selection. […] may be called their 'structural characteristics'" (Hirschman 1967a, p. 4 Candidate projects for inclusion in Hirschman's study had to meet three basic criteria: they had to be diverse in sector and geographical area; they had to have a history; and, finally, they had to be identifiable activities which required continued maintenance and brought about identifiable linkage effects. Hydroelectric projects, specific highways, or industries (preferably basic ones) were the natural candidates, as opposed to loans for general highway reconstruction and maintenance activities, for the purchase of agricultural machinery, or for balance of payments purposes (Hirschman 1967a, p. 3 
The Genesis of the Bank's Evaluation Department
The (King, Jr. 1967; Tendler 1982; 1993) .
Thus, in the mid-1960s, the World Bank and Albert Hirschman, along with several other major players in the development field, were in agreement that it was essential to focus on specific case studies in order to derive insights into the mechanisms that governed development projects. It was a shift away from broad comprehensive strategies as the main methodological focus of development economics, and the World Bank was actively involved in this shift. Dani Rodrik recently emphasized, among the major features of the so-called new development economics, its being diagnostic rather than presumptive, experimental (in the broad sense of "a predisposition to find out what works through policy innovation"), based on monitoring and evaluation, aimed at selective and targeted reforms, suspicious of universal recipes and best practices and, instead, focused on policy reforms (Rodrik 2008, pp. 27-28) .
These were also characteristics of Hirschman's analysis of development projects and policies.
During the 1980s and early 1990s, and until the disavowal of the mid-1990s, the World Bank often applied a universalistic, one-size-fits-all approach, especially with its emphasis on macro policies (World Bank 2005) . It is thus interesting to note that well before, in the early 1960s, the Bank was agreeing with Hirschman on positions that are in tune with today's most articulate analyses of development economics. At that time, although it was perhaps a rather experimental stage, nobody in the business of development doubted the importance of building development policies based on thorough case diagnostics. At the opposite side of the spectrum of projects with institution-building potential, one might consider highways. As a matter of fact, highway construction always left ample margins for improvisation, sloppiness, cutting corners, and sacrificing quality for quantity without any specific drive toward the implementation of more structured and effective institutions. Hirschman's terminology, this was an opposition between "foot loose" (roads and thermoelectric power generation) and "resource tied" public utilities. 41 If we consider projects from the point of view of institution-building, irrigation would produce the maximum effect, highways the minimum, and railroads and electric power would fall somewhere in between.
Diverging views on project appraisal
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Highways were nonetheless an interesting case study for the links between social phenomena and economic development. Often, Hirschman argued, road maintenance is prompted by a combination of physical deterioration and public protest: there is no doubt that the truck drivers refusing to pay road tolls because of the roads' poor condition will negatively affect the financial resources needed to repair the roads, but, at the same time, their actions signal that the roads have reached an unacceptable level of deterioration, and this will probably induce a reaction (i.e., road maintenance). 43 In his The Strategy of Economic Development (1958), Hirschman had discussed at length the fact that in less developed countries, often the resource that was actually lacking was not capital or any other physical asset, but rather the ability to make decisions; he urged to introduce "inducement mechanisms" that function as substitutes for this missing ability. The circular mechanism of (i) road use, (ii In his "Interim Observations," Hirschman argued that the Bank had thus far ignored those questions: "the projects appear to be judged wholly on their technical merits." 44 In the notes taken during their field trips -but not in the "Interim Observations" -Albert and Sarah
Hirschman fully elaborated on the limits of judging projects by only their technical merits, directly addressing the fundamental question of social equality and redistributive issues.
"Profitability alone," they maintained, "is no yardstick for social desirability of investment." 45 Hirschman also focused on some specific Bank policies usually set forth as pre-conditions of lending: the Bank's preference for dealing with development agencies independent from the national government and with contractors selected through international biddings; the Bank's insistence that governments should profit from public utilities established through its loans;
and the Bank's insistence on exerting strict control over the internal administrative processes of the borrowing countries. Hirschman underscored instead the need to adapt to specific circumstances. 46 During his travels, he had noticed that certain agencies, which in principle were supposed to be autonomous from the national government, were actually impeded in effective decision-making by disunited Boards, whereas more streamlined chains of command in governmental ministries could prove to be more effective. In other cases, autonomous authorities were turning into semi-feudal centers of power, effectively making coordination among different branches of the national government impossible and destroying the principle of the unity of the budget. 47 As for the Bank's attempts to control the internal administrative processes of the borrowing countries, Hirschman noted that very often this was plainly impossible: internal difficulties within recipient governments and intra-governmental conflicts were a common characteristic of borrowing countries, and the first casualty of these In other cases, Hirschman's assumptions were considered plainly wrong. In his "Interim
Observations" he had stated that the Bank's task was "to undertake projects that are unattractive to private capital because uncertainty surrounding their success is too high." 57 A commentator sharply noted that "it has been the policy of the Bank not to make loans for projects where uncertainties surrounding their success were high on the ground that the borrower's welfare and development would be best served if his investments were made, and
Bank money used, only for sound projects." 58 As for Hirschman's claim that the Bank insisted on dealing with agencies that were autonomous from government, it was remarked that the point was not, as Hirschman seemed to see it, the theoretical opposition of politically autonomous agencies vs. politically dependent agencies, but rather the practical separation of political and managerial functions. 59 In this respect, Warren Baum argued that the Bank was far from doctrinaire, while those familiar with Hirschman's chosen examples considered them "singularly inappropriate." 60 Some Bank officials also doubted that it would be useful for the Bank to explicitly address political and social factors in project appraisal. The Bank was perceived by its staff as relatively free from political pressures and driven by a technocratic
approach. An explicit inclusion of political and social considerations in project appraisal, therefore, meant that the Bank would be "vulnerable to every variety of reaction from member countries and would lose its fortunate position." 61 An important cause for criticism from Bank officers was that Hirschman showed a complete disinterest in quantitative evaluations, focusing instead on a qualitative analysis or, as he wrote, on "comparing 'personal profiles' of projects in different sectors." 62 To a bureaucracy that expected Hirschman's study to shed some light on issues such as the measurement of indirect economic benefits of projects and the feasibility and the effects of applying shadow prices for products and factors of production, this was most likely disappointing. 63 first chapter, "The principle of the hiding hand," "a bit thin, particularly with respect to relevant guidance for those who must decide whether to undertake, continue, or complete a proposed project." 67 This was not unexpected, since Asher himself had previously called Hirschman's theses "disconcerting […] to those in quest of clearer criteria to govern eligibility for foreign aid" (Asher 1962, p. 217) . In "The principle of the hiding hand,"
Hirschman stated that the underestimation of problems is a powerful mechanism that allows projects to be taken up that would never otherwise be initiated. According to Hirschman, the problems that arise when a project is under implementation usually trigger a creative effort that leads to their solution. Differently from Toynbee's theory of challenge and response, Hirschman's principle posited that "people undertake some new task not because of a challenge, but because of the assumed absence of a challenge." 68 Toynbee's thesis, according to Hirschman, was an ex-post rationalization, "per fare bella figura."
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Though rhetorically forceful and "Hirschmanesque" (Walter Salant's term), this principle left many unconvinced. Even the members of the Brookings Advisory Committee who were more favorable to Hirschman's approach, such as Walter Salant or Edward Mason, considered the principle one-sided. 70 Salant, for example, noted that this principle, far from being a general principle as Hirschman seemed to imply, was only one of the many possible associations between the estimation of problems and the estimation of one's ability to solve them: of course problems might be underestimated, but they might also be either correctly estimated or overestimated, and the same would be true for the ability to solve them. Nine outcomes were actually possible, from the successful Hiding Hand to sheer disaster (when an underestimated problem is coupled with an overestimated ability to solve it).
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Years later, Hirschman admitted that his opening chapter "was close to a provocation.
Nothing could be less 'operationally useful' than to be told that underestimating the costs or difficulties of a project has on occasion been helpful in eliciting creative energies that otherwise might never have been forthcoming" (Hirschman 1994, p. ix) . But this was the point: the principle of the hiding hand, based as it was on the actor's ignorance, was not intended to be a policy tool. It was a way for Hirschman to elaborate on the need to include uncertainty and limited rationality in the Bank's epistemology. While this principle received its final name in juxtaposition to Adam Smith's "invisible hand," its original name was perhaps more revelatory: in January 1965, from India, Hirschman wrote a long explanation of what he then used to call his "theory of providential ignorance" to his two daughters in New York:
The Pakistan project, the Karnaphuli paper mill, is perhaps most interesting because it shows that it isn't so easy to 'transfer' an industry from one country to another. It looks easy -why shouldn't the same machines perform just as well in East Pakistan as in Sweden? The fact is, however, that there are many differences, from the raw materials (bamboo instead of pine) to the demand in the market which require far more 'creative' adaptation than the country had probably expected it would to be. One almost feels that had they known all the troubles they were headed for, they would never have founded this industry, but having founded it they managed to solve their problems one by one. The secret of creativity is then to place yourself in situations where you've got to be creative, but this is done only when one doesn't know in advance that one will have to be creative. This, in turn, is so because we underestimate our creative resources; quite properly, we cannot believe in our creativity until we experience it; and since we thus necessarily underestimate our creative resources we do not consciously engage upon tasks which we know require such resources; hence the only way in which we can bring our creative resources into play is by similarly underestimating the difficulty of a task.
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More generally, Hirschman underscored the centrality of side-effects, and in his 1967 book he described project appraisal as the art of visualizing them. In his definition, side-effects are not just "secondary effects," mere spillovers or repercussions of a project. More often than not, they turn out to be "inputs essential to the realization of the project's principal effect and purpose" (Hirschman 1967a, p. 161) . They are called "effects" instead of, for example, "conditions" or "prerequisites" because they are "eventual requirements," essential for the project to survive after the start-up and mature into a long-lived endeavor, although they are develops the trucking industry and therefore enhances entrepreneurship. But this secondary effect may have much wider consequences: "entrepreneurship means political power, which in turn means the ability to change the rules of the transportation game decisively in favor of the highways" (Hirschman 1967a, p. 162) , and what might seem a mere secondary-effect (enhanced entrepreneurship) becomes a decisive element, making the decision to develop motorways instead of railways irreversible. For this reason side-effects are at the same time necessary and unpredictable, and therefore central in Hirschman's approach: "a search for the indirect effects is to be recommended if only as a heuristic device, as a means of identifying some of the basic conditions for the project's success" (Hirschman 1967a, p. 169) .
Cost-benefit analysis and its attempt to make precise calculations of the secondary effects of investments, according to Hirschman, turned this search for indirect effects into an excessively rigid process, hampered by too many arbitrary assumptions, and made the quest for a unique ranking a futile exercise. "How could it be expected," wondered Hirschman, "that it is possible to rank development projects along a single scale by amalgamating all their varied dimensions into a single index when far simpler, everyday choices require the use of individual or collective judgment in the weighing of alternative objectives and in the trade-off between them," especially when the aim is not to facilitate the decision-maker's exercise of informed judgment, but to make him dispense with such judgment altogether (Hirschman 1967a, p. 179) . The following passage captures Hirschman's unsystematic approach, his idea that it is impossible to detect a set of criteria uniformly applicable to all projects:
Upon inspection, each project turns out to represent a unique constellation of experiences and consequences, of direct and indirect effects. This uniqueness in turn results from the varied interplay between the structural characteristics of projects, on the one hand, and the social and political environment, on the other. To facilitate the understanding of this interplay I focused […] on various properties of projects -primarily uncertainties and latitudes -that condition their total behavior and career […] . There was no intention to erect these manifold aspects of project behavior into full-fledged criteria that should be applied to all projects; rather I was seeking to provide project planners and operators with a large set of glasses with which to discern probable lines of project behavior, in the expectation that the analysis of each individual project would require different and rather limited subsets of the full set of glasses which has been exhibited (Hirschman 1967a, p. 186 , emphasis in the original).
By the time Hirschman was drafting the manuscript of his book, it had become clear that his research agenda was at variance with the Bank's. The comment of an early supporter of Hirschman's project summarizes the discouragement within the Bank at the end of their collaboration:
I was one of the original supporters of World Bank cooperation with Professor Hirschman because of my conviction that the Bank still has a good deal to learn about project preparation and evaluation and because I thought that a fresh look by a perceptive and objective observer could add significantly to our knowledge of this important subject. However, I don't believe the manuscript does this. It is well written and contains a number of interesting observations. But by and large it does not contain any operationally useful analysis of the merits and priority of the particular projects observed by Professor Hirschman or of the kind of reshaping or rethinking of the projects which might have made them better. In short, I for one gained no significant new insights into the process of project preparation and evaluation. 
The Roots of the Disagreement
Hirschman's attempt to establish a qualitative approach to project appraisal had as its cornerstone the detailed historical reconstruction of the "personal profiles" of projects as well as their larger political and social context. It aimed at underscoring "the element of the unknown, the uncertain and the unexpected," as Hirschman put it, in order to understand what deflected the projects from their originally charted course. Finally, its goal was to assess the broader impact of a project, such as its effects on the distribution of wealth, income and power in the affected population. Hirschman's approach to project appraisal was a natural evolution of his previous work, which had marked an increasing distance from the early debates in development theories. The "failure of several of the earlier ideas as practical policy solutions," as Tony Killick put it (Killick 1978, p. 27, italics resulting in a hybrid between a "summary and conclusions" for practitioners as proposed by van der Tak, and a series of "annotated questions" about projects as proposed by Hirschman.
However, a proper operational version of Hirschman's book never saw light.
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While the Bank was struggling with the seeming inapplicability of Hirschman's reflections, cost-benefit analysis received a tremendous boost from research pursued by other multilateral organizations. Cost-benefit analysis had been taking shape in the 1920s as a technique in water-resources development, cultivated mostly by engineers, which subjected public investment decisions to economic analysis and evaluated alternative projects in terms of the maximization of public "utility." It received a further stimulus during the 1930s expansion of public investment activity in the United States, especially thanks to the Flood Control Act of 1936, which dictated that only projects whose benefits were projected to exceed their costs could receive federal funds. However, the intrinsic difficulties of quantifying the projects' effects, compounded with competing views among the different bureaucracies that had authority on water management in the United States, made it impossible to agree on a standardized method of cost-benefit analysis until the 1960s (Porter 1995, pp. 148-189) .
Moreover, as Stephen Marglin observed, "benefit-cost analysis was introduced as a means of project 'justification' alone […] , not as a tool for project planning; in American practice (as distinct from theory) it often has served as window dressing for projects whose plans have already been formulated with little if any reference to economic criteria" (Marglin 1967, p. 18) . 78 A push toward standardization and uniformity came only in the late 1940s and especially the 1950s, as a way to overcome conflict among agencies and because of the increasing interest in cost-benefit analysis among economists: the development of the new welfare economics after World War II gave intellectual legitimacy to the attempt to turn, as a critic put it, "a useful way of roughly assessing the promise of a particular project, or comparing various ways of carrying out a project," into "a precision tool for attaining general economic efficiency" (Hammond 1966, p. 222) .
Hirschman had already shown doubts about the accuracy of cost-benefit analysis in his preliminary work for the Bank. In that specific case, however, Hirschman seemed more concerned about the possible inhibitory role of cost-benefit analysis than about its role as ex- immediately regarded as a ground-breaking contribution in project appraisal in developing countries, especially for their use of shadow-prices, i.e., prices that were meant to reflect the social effects of projects, as opposed to their private profitability (Little-Mirrlees 1968; ).
In the turn of a few years, this approach had become "a school" that directly influenced "the thinking of economists engaged in planning in developing countries" (Kornai 1979, p. 76) . In 1972, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) published another milestone volume in project appraisal, authored by Partha Dasgupta, Stephen Marglin and Amartya Sen (Dasgupta, Marglin and Sen 1972) . Although the differences from LittleMirrlees' approach were important (see, for example, the comparison of OECD and UNIDO 78 See the several examples in Porter 1995. "Especially on quantitative matters," Porter writes, "the responsible congressional committees could be dazzlingly uninquisitive. They asked many factual questions, but it rarely mattered what the answer was. Often the record was left blank for a time, and the response to a statistical query would be inserted afterwards" (Porter 1995, p. 156) .
approaches by Dasgupta 1972 , and a critique of the OECD volume by Frances Stewart and Paul Streeten 1972) , the two approaches still had enough in common to be viewed "in some immediate sense [as] similar" (Dasgupta 1972, p. 41) or having "a similar spirit" (Kornai 1979, p. 76) . To be sure, both these approaches discussed the role of uncertainty in project design and appraisal. But in practical matters, they tended to conflate this term with what is usually meant by "risk," that is, something subject to measurement. 80 Hirschman, instead, following the usual Knightian dichotomy between "risk" and "uncertainty," considered uncertainty a quality that was impossible to measure. In an article from the early 1960s, coauthored with political scientist Charles Lindblom, Hirschman elaborated on the impossibility of quantification at a more general level: "it is clearly impossible to specify in advance the optimal doses of […] various policies under different circumstances. The art of promoting economic development […] consists, then, in acquiring a feeling for these doses" (Hirschman [1962 (Hirschman [ ] 1971 .
By the early 1970s, in any case, Hirschman's book had been completely forgotten. The 1974
Little-Mirrlees book dismissed it as "a stimulating essay on the theme that any assessment leaves things out" (Little and Mirrlees 1974, p. 379) , and the rest of the literature completely Another issue may have accounted, if not for the oblivion into which Hirschman's book fell, at least for the reaction it prompted in the Bank -a reason that has more to do with the sociology of organizations than the history of development economics. The dismissal of Hirschman's work by several Bank staff may have been due to the fact that he was an outsider to the institution, but commented on (and criticized) its core activity, and the ability of its staff to read and interpret development patterns. This distrust had first appeared in the "Interim Observations" that Hirschman had circulated. On that occasion, a staff member dismissed
Hirschman's observations on Bank policies as "the echo of some of the most frequently recurring beefs we heard from the other side of the fence, but only from some people on the 79 Albert O. Hirschman, "A study of completed investment projects which have received financial support from the World Bank", June 5, 1963, World Bank Hirschman Folders Vol. 1, italics in the original. 80 In the chapter "Project evaluation under uncertainty," Partha Dasgupta wrote: "In this chapter we shall be concerned with projects that are risky and, violating the established convention, we shall use the term 'risky' and other side of the fence, not necessarily representative people," and accused Hirschman of having been heavily one-sided and uninterested in the Bank's viewpoint. 81 Another staff
commented: "what [Hirschman] is trying to do is to call our attention to some of the pitfalls inherent in our operations.
[…] It is useful to have an outsider's reminders and the advantage of his perspective. But we should be sure that Mr. Hirschman has access to all the facts, and all the points of view, before completing his book. In the academic and literary professions, criticism seems to draw higher marks than does praise, and while Mr. Hirschman is very knowledgeable and capable, he may not be above succumbing to this temptation." 82 Even when there was no suspicion from the Bank's commentator that Hirschman might be fishing for praise through indiscriminate criticism, there remained concern that his academic perspective would render his effort irrelevant to the operations of a development institution like the World Bank. Duncan Ballantine -a former academic himself -noted that Hirschman was attempting a "marriage between two inherently incompatible points of view -that of the decision maker and that of the academician or seeker of truth." 83 While he recognized the value of such an exercise, the risk of irrelevance due to the prevalence of the academic perspective was high. The common note was that an outsider was not equipped to understand the Bank's operations.
The legitimacy of comments, criticisms, and advice from external subjects is a sensitive issue at the heart of the evaluation function. Even for the Bank's internal (but independent)
Operations Evaluation Department, balancing independence and objectivity with collaboration and communication between operational and evaluation staff has always been a major challenge. This equilibrium is highly unstable, and subject to recurrent swings. At times, the evaluation unit has seemed insufficiently independent and credible, as a Bank officer Perhaps even more discouraging is the testimony of a former OED Director, who maintained that when he worked in Operations he was not influenced, either directly or indirectly, by OED's output: "the typical reaction of operational staff to [OED's] findings was still to dispute the factual details and to question the usefulness of the findings, and to attack OED's methodology" (Köpp 2003, p. 55) . No wonder that Albert Hirschman experienced similar criticisms.
Concluding Remarks
This shows that, on the contrary, the Bank was an active participant in the development economics debates and the shift in focus that took place in the 1960s. This may be of interest for today's
